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SMEDLEY V. SMEDLEY, 772 F.3D 184 
 (4TH CIR. 2014). 
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
ON THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
 




 Germany and the U.S. are two of the original signatories to the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (Hague Convention). 1   The purposes of the Hague 
Convention and its implementing statute, the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act, are to secure “the prompt return of 
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained” in any 
contracting state by one parent.2  In addition, they seek to ensure that 
countries respect the “rights of custody and of access under the law 
of” other countries. 3   In implementing the Hague Convention, 
Congress recognized “the need for uniform international 
interpretation” among contracting states.4  The comity of nations 
                                                
 * Candidate for Juris Doctor 2016, University of South Carolina 
School of Law. 
 1 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act, 
Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980).  As of February 2015, seventy-
three states and territories have ratified or acceded to the Hague 
Convention.  See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, U.S. Hague Convention Treaty Partners, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/hague-
party-countries.html (last visited June 17, 2015).  
 2 International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2 et seq., 22 
U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) (2012). 
 3 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 
89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].  
 4 § 9001(b)(3)(B). 
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governs the extent to which the U.S. honors the judicial decree of a 
foreign country.5  
 This case comment will discuss and evaluate the Fourth Circuit’s 
opinion in Smedley v. Smedley.6  This case involves an international 
comity decision under the Hague Convention reviewing a German 
court’s denial of a Hague petition filed by a father for the return of 
his two children to the U.S. after their mother wrongfully removed 
them to Germany, and later wrongfully retained by their father in the 
U.S.7  The German appellate court denied the father’s Hague petition, 
ruling that the defense to wrongful removal (grave risk of harm and 
consent) applied under the circumstances.8  In Smedley, the Fourth 
Circuit did not find the German appellate court’s decision 
unreasonable.9  After a methodical review of the German court’s path 
to denial of the father’s Hague petition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, which bestowed comity to the foreign 
court, and ordered the return of the children to Germany with their 
mother.10 
 
I.  HISTORY 
 
 The Hague Convention represents a policy-based attempt by the 
U.S. and other joined countries to preserve international comity by 
trying cases involving child abduction in the country where they 
arise.11  As the Pérez Vera Report states, “the Convention rests 
implicitly upon the principle that any debate on the merits of the 
question, i.e., of custody rights, should take place before the 
competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual 
                                                
 5 Comity is “[a] practice among political entities (as countries, 
states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual 
recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.”  BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 324 (10th ed. 2014); Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 
F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 6 772 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 7 Id. at 187.  
 8 Id. at 187, 190. 
 9 Id. at 191. 
 10 Id.  
 11 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
98. 
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residence prior to its removal.”12  When a court “[o]rder[s] a return 
remedy . . . [it] allows the courts of the home country to decide what 
is in the child's best interests.”13   Further, “[i]t is the [Hague] 
Convention's premise that courts in contracting states will make this 
determination in a responsible manner.”14  
 The Hague Convention often comes into play when one parent 
abducts a child from the child’s habitual residence, taking the child to 
the abducting parent's home country in order to gain a more favorable 
custody ruling.15  When determining a child’s habitual residence, U.S. 
courts take into account whether the parents share an intent to make a 
particular country the child's home, and whether enough time has 
passed for the child to acclimate to the residence.16  If a removal or 
retention is found wrongful, Article 12 provides that the parent must 
return the child unless certain defenses apply.17  If a defense applies, 
return is discretionary.18  Defenses include: (1) the person who had 
care of the child “was not actually exercising the custody rights at the 
time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently 
acquiesced in the removal or retention”; (2) there is a grave risk that 
“return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm”; 
and (3) “the child objects to being returned and has attained an age 
and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
views.”19   
The U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]he merits of [a 
foreign] case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the 
                                                
12 See Elisa Pérez Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention, in 3 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH SESSION 426, 430 (Permanent Bureau trans., 1982), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter 
Pérez Vera Report]. 
 13 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See U.S. Interpretation of “Rights of Custody” Under the 
Hague Child-Abduction Convention, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 207 
(2003); Hague Convention supra note 3, art.1–6, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
98–99. 
 16 See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 17 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12–13, 1343 
U.N.T.S. at 100–01. 
 18 Id. art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
 19 Id. 
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judgment, be tried afresh.”20  However, U.S. federal appellate courts 
look closely at the merits of the foreign court’s decision in deciding 
whether comity can properly be extended to their judgment.21  The 
Ninth Circuit indicated that “[e]xtension of comity to a foreign 
judgment ‘is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, 
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.’”22  Likewise, the 
Second Circuit stated that the foreign court’s holding deserves some 
“deference, but, in order to determine how much deference,” it is 
“appropriate to give some consideration to the subsidiary 
determinations that underlie the holding.”23  
 
II.  FACTS 
 
 Mark Smedley married his wife, Daniela, while he was in the 
military stationed overseas.24  They married in 2000, and had two 
children while living in Germany.25  Mark was then transferred back 
to North Carolina, where he and his family moved in 2010.26  During 
a period of marital difficulties while living in the U.S., Daniela told 
Mark she wished “to separate and move with the children.” 27  
Subsequently, “Mark bought . . . round-trip plane tickets” to 
Germany for Daniela and the children “with a return date of August 
11, 2011.”28  However, Mark claimed he only consented to a one-
month vacation, while Daniela maintained that he agreed to an 
indefinite period of time in which she could reconsider their 
                                                
 20 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895). 
 21 See Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 22 Id. (quoting Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators 
Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 23 Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 24 Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 25 Id.  The “children, A.H.S. and G.A.S., were born in 2000 and 
2005, respectively[,]” making A.H.S. about fourteen and G.A.S. 
about nine years old during litigation in the Fourth Circuit.  Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 6, Smedley v. Smedley, 772 
F.3d 184 (2014) (No. 14-1414), 2014 WL 3572731, at *6.  
 28 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187. 
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separation and think things over.29  Soon after, Daniela informed 
Mark that she would remain in Germany with the children, despite 
his objections.30   
 Mark immediately filed a petition in Germany under the Hague 
Convention for the return of the children to the U.S.31  The District 
Court of Bamberg denied the petition, finding that Daniela 
established one of the four Article 13 defenses,32 specifically, the 
grave-risk exception.33  The court relied on a report from a court-
appointed family advocate who stated that sending the children back 
to the U.S. would expose them to a serious risk of physical or 
psychological harm.34  Upon Mark’s appeal, the German appellate 
court found that he agreed to a permanent move and stated Daniela’s 
testimony was more credible.35  “As consent is another of the Article 
13 defenses, the court held that” determining the children’s habitual 
residence was unnecessary.36   
On May 7, 2012, Mark and Daniela obtained a divorce 
declaration in Germany.37  The court ordered that both parties share 
custody of their children, but directed that the children were to live 
                                                
 29 Id.  According to Daniela, “Mark told her that should she fail 
to change her mind, he would try to relocate to Germany to be close 
to his children.”  Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 7.   
 30 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring proof, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that one of the exceptions set forth in 
Article 13(b) or 20 of the Hague Convention applies); 22 U.S.C. § 
9003(e)(2)(B) (demanding proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some exception set forth in Article 12 or 13 of the Hague 
Convention applies).  
 33 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187. 
 34 Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 6.  Mark 
allegedly beat both children with his hands, and at times beat the 
older one with a belt.  Id. 
 35 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187.  The German court held that 
Daniela’s testimony was consistent, detailed, coherent, and 
corroborated by the older child.  Id. at 190. 
 36 Id. at 187–88. 
 37 Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 11. 
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with Daniela in Germany. 38   After almost two years living in 
Germany, Daniela agreed to let the children visit Mark in the U.S.; 
however, he failed to return them on the agreed upon date.39  Daniela 
filed a Hague petition in a district court in North Carolina on April 7, 
2014.40  Acting on that petition, the U.S. district court accorded 
comity to the decision of the German appellate court and found that 
the “German court’s failure to determine the children’s habitual 
residence” based on Mark’s consent was reasonable.41  The U.S. 
district court also found the German court’s determination that 
Daniela was more credible was at least minimally reasonable, and 
“that Germany was the children’s habitual residence” when they 
visited Mark in North Carolina.42  On May 2, 2014, pursuant to the 
district court's order, Daniela returned to Germany with both 
children.43  Mark appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing “the district 
court erred in according comity” 44  because the German court 
misinterpreted the Hague Convention and its “decision did not meet a 







                                                
 38 Id. at 12.  Mark never tried to change this order, dispute its 
validity, or argue that the German court lacked power to enter the 
custody order.  Id.  
 39 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 188.  Mark signed a notarized document 
stating that he would pick up the children on or about August 6, 
2013, and that the children would be returning on or about August 
26, 2013, unless Daniela was otherwise notified.  Brief of Petitioner-
Appellee, supra note 27, at 1.  Mark did not return the children 
during the designated time, and sent Daniela a Facebook message 
stating that he would be keeping the children with him in North 
Carolina.  Id.  
 40 Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 14. 
 41 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 188. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 188. 
 44 Id. at 186. 
 45 Id. at 190. 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  REPORT 
 
 The Fourth Circuit delivered its decision in November of 2014, 
which affirmed the lower court’s grant of comity to the foreign 
judgment.46  The court disagreed with Mark’s contention that the 
German court misinterpreted the Hague Convention by failing to 
make a habitual residence determination before addressing consent, 
stating that it was “pure conjecture.”47  The court noted a habitual-
residence determination “was not dispositive or even helpful”48 in 
Smedley, as the foreign court found Mark had consented to the 
move—one of the four defenses to wrongful removal of a child under 
the Hague Convention.49 
 The court also found the German court’s decision was at least 
minimally reasonable concerning Daniela’s testimony being more 
credible than Mark’s based on the facts for two reasons.50  First, one 
of the children corroborated Daniela’s testimony.51  Second, Mark’s 
credibility was further undermined when evidence was produced 
showing that he lied to the court about his knowledge of Daniela’s 
decision to stay in Germany.52   
Next, the court compared the consent determination in 
Asvesta v. Petroutsas, where the father wrote an email consenting 
only to the temporary travel of his wife and their children, with the 
present case and found that no comparable evidence rendered the 
                                                
 46 Id. at 191. 
 47 Id. at 189. 
 48 Id. at 190. 
 49 Id. at 189–90. 
 50 Id. at 190. 
 51 Id. at 191.  
 52 See id. at 190.  Mark initially told the German court that he 
first learned of Daniela's decision to stay in Germany the day before 
their scheduled return flight.  Id.  Nine days earlier he wrote a 
Facebook post that read in part, “Please come back to me.  I am 
really taking this hard right now.”  Id.  Additionally, the German 
court found that Mark’s testimony through his lawyer was unreliable 
and inaccurate.  Id.  
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German court’s finding of consent unreasonable. 53   The court 
rightfully found the German court’s decision met the requisite 
standard of reasonableness, and therefore it properly extended comity 
to the foreign adjudication.54  The Fourth Circuit noted that decisions 
rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full 
faith and credit, but the court will accord considerable deference to 
foreign judgments as a matter of comity.55   
 
B.  ANALYSIS 
 
 Although the Fourth Circuit reached the appropriate result in 
Smedley, its strict adherence to the principles of comity could create a 
situation in which a court would grant comity despite the fact that a 
foreign court fails to meet the necessary standard of reasonableness.  
As uniform interpretation is the chief objective of the Hague 
Convention,56 situations may arise when courts in other contracting 
states misinterpret its provisions.  U.S. courts do not have an 
established boundary at which to disallow international judicial 
deference.  The circuit courts have interpreted the law differently—
the Second Circuit accorded comity even though it considered a 
foreign court’s judgment “troubling,” yet the Ninth Circuit declined 
to extend comity when it found that the foreign court misapplied the 
Hague Convention. 57   Moreover, if a court applies the wrong 
standard, then the Hague Convention provides neither an 
enforcement mechanism nor an oversight body to ensure its proper 
implementation. 58   Nevertheless, judges in the U.S. courts 
successfully support the principle that “comity is at the heart of the 
                                                
 53 Id. at 191. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 189. 
 56 See 22 U.S.C. §9001(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 57 Compare Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 146 (2d Cir. 
2001), with Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1021 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 58 See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2, 241–42 (P.B. 
Carter ed., Oxford 1999). 
2015 SMEDLEY V. SMEDLEY, 772 F.3D 184 (4TH CIR.2014) 269 
 THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
 ON THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
Hague Convention”59 by citing and relying on the reasoning of 
foreign cases.60    
 One of the purposes of the Hague Convention is to deter parents 
from crossing international boundaries in search of a more 
sympathetic court.61  When considering this obligation of impartiality, 
however, it is questionable whether the German district court fairly 
conducted the Hague petition proceedings.  Mark was present only 
through his attorney when the German court found the testimony of 
Daniela, a German citizen, more credible, and that Mark consented to 
her move to Germany with the children.62  She claimed Mark told her 
that he would try and relocate to Germany to remain close to the 
children should she refuse to change her mind during the conditional 
move.63  Accepting this assertion as true, Mark did not consent to a 
permanent move, but only to a conditional one.  Further, Mark 
testified that he merely agreed to a one-month vacation, which is 
evidenced by the round-trip plane tickets he purchased for Daniela 
and the children.64  However, under Article 13(a), courts decide the 
issue of consent only by a preponderance of the evidence standard.65  
Therefore, after contemplating the corroboration of Daniela’s 
testimony by one of the children and the evidence of Mark’s 
inconsistency, the German court likely came to the accurate 
conclusion that Mark consented to the move.66  Consequently, the 
Fourth Circuit correctly found the German court’s finding of consent 
at least minimally reasonable.   Nevertheless, courts should avoid 
conducting such proceedings without both parents present, as well as 
                                                
 59 Diorinou, 237 F.3d at 142. 
 60 See Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and 
Failures of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 285, 370 (2000).  This shift is not as visible 
in Germany because Germany is a civil law country and judges are 
not prone to citing cases.  Id. 
 61 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999).  See also Pub. 
Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 62 Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 63 Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 7.  
 64 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187. 
 65 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
101. 
 66 Smedley, 772 F.3d at 190. 
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prejudicially ruling in favor of its nation’s citizens in order to 
comport with the Hague Convention’s standards of fairness.67   
 The implementing body of the Hague Convention recognizes the 
extreme importance of each signatory member to view all other 
contracting nations as having competent courts for custody and 
family dissolution determinations.68  The Fourth Circuit’s decision to 
accord comity to the German court clearly supports this policy.  Thus, 
the court established the appropriate precedent to allow U.S. courts to 
work with courts of others countries to remedy the wrongful taking 
of children across international borders.   
 
C.  PRACTICAL IMPACT 
 
1.  CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO BE HEARD 
 
 When considering the functional impact of Smedley, it is 
noteworthy that neither the German courts nor the U.S. courts 
discussed the best interests of the children.  Although concerns of 
international comity are significant, they should “be weighed against 
the best interests and safety of” children in Hague Convention 
proceedings.69  Courts analogize the Article 13 exception to wrongful 
removal or retention—“the child objects to being returned and has 
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to 
take account of its views”70—with a best interests analysis in which 
the child’s preference would not necessarily be given dispositive 
weight.71  The Hague Convention does not state the necessary age for 
                                                
 67 But see Wolfe, supra note 60, at 295 (“The definition of 
habitual residence applied by German courts often favors the parent 
who left a marital residence in another state and returned to 
Germany.”). 
 68 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
98. 
 69 See Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: 
Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention 
on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 671 
(2001). 
 70 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
101. 
 71 See Wolfe, supra note 60, at 337. 
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objection, and seems to defer to the judge to make that 
determination.72  
U.S. courts are divided on the requisite age of maturity.  
Some have found an eight-year-old to be of the necessary age,73 
while another court returned a mature nine-year-old over his strong 
objections.74  Although courts have considered this factor, one 
researcher found that no case in the U.S. relied exclusively on a 
child’s objection to deny a return order.75  Unlike courts in the U.S., 
German courts “do not recognize a minimum age at which a child's 
objections gain conclusive weight.”76  However, in practice, 
“German courts have given more weight to the objections of young 
children,” unless “the court finds the child is too young” or has been 
                                                
 72 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 
101 (“The judicial or administrative authorities may also refuse to 
order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 
appropriate to take account of its views.”).  See also Pérez-Vera 
Report, supra note 12, at 460 (“[T]he very nature of these exceptions 
gives judges a discretion—and does not impose upon them a duty—
to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances.”). 
 73 See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (considering views of an eight-year-old child who was 
composed, calmly and readily answered questions, pointed to New 
Zealand on a globe, and indicated her understanding of the difference 
between truth and falsehood and of her obligation to tell the truth).  
But see In re Zarate, 1996 WL 734613 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding an 
eight-year-old lacked maturity when she did not know her birth year 
or classes and confused her natural father with her stepfather). 
 74 See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1362 (M.D. Fl. 2002) (returning both a mature nine-year-old, whose 
undisputed testimony showed he desired to remain in America, and 
his younger brother to Argentina). 
 75 See Wolfe, supra note 60 at 335–36. 
 76 Id. at 335.  Although the views of the child are not dispositive, 
“[u]nder German Family law, children's views are required to be 
taken into account and it is normal for children, even quite young, to 
appear in court.”  The Justice Department’s Response to 
International Parental Child Kidnaping: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106 Cong. 34 (1999) (statement of Catherine I. Meyer).  
272 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 11.2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
unduly influenced.77  In Smedley, the German courts disregarded the 
children’s wishes in deciding not to return them to the U.S. during 
the Hague petition proceedings.  However, the children were 
approximately seven-years-old and twelve-years-old at the time of 
the litigation;78 thus, it is unclear whether they were of the 
appropriate age and possessed the requisite degree of maturity for a 
U.S. court to consider their views. 
 While the child's age is important, his or her “emotional and 
psychological bonds . . . are also important.”79  Either the judge or 
the parties may appoint a psychologist as an expert to help determine 
if a child is of sufficient maturity to influence this determination;80 
however, only a small number of cases address the appropriate 
weight to apply to such an expert's testimony.81  Many courts have 
completely rejected psychologists’ testimony by finding it to be 
“appropriate in a custody proceeding, not in a Hague Convention 
case,”82 while others rely heavily upon it when deciding whether to 
apply this exception.83  Although the German court in Smedley 
                                                
 77 Wolfe, supra note 60, at 335–36. 
 78 Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014).  The 
“children, A.H.S. and G.A.S., were born in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively.”  Id.  Mark filed the Hague petition in 2011.  Id. 
 79 Linda D. Elrod, "Please Let Me Stay": Hearing the Voice of 
the Child in Hague Abduction Cases, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 679 
(2011). 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Morrison v. Dietz, No. 07-1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *12 
(W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008) (failing to accept the psychologist's 
determination on whether the mature child or grave-risk exceptions 
should apply); Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 489 (1992) 
(“Psychological profiles, detailed evaluations of parental fitness, 
evidence concerning lifestyle and the nature and quality of 
relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue [of custody] to the 
appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual residence.”).  
 83 See, e.g., Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1381 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006) (agreeing with the psychologist’s opinion that the child 
was not old enough or mature enough for the court to consider the 
child’s objection in determining whether to return the child, even 
though the court considered the child to be an impressive eleven-
year-old); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000) (allowing two psychologists to provide 
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appointed a family advocate, the court did not articluate the 
advocate’s opinion about whether the children wished to live with 
their father in the U.S. or remain in Germany.84   
 
2.  THE GRAVE-RISK EXCEPTION 
 
 Although the Article 13 grave-risk exception was not dispositive 
in Smedley, its interpretation is likely the most debated subject of the 
Hague Convention.  The concept of comity among nations argues for 
very limited use of this exception.85  Accordingly, in Friedrich v. 
Friedrich,86 the Sixth Circuit stated that the provision implies much 
more than serious risk.87  In Friedrich, a mother made no allegations 
of abuse, but instead raised concerns that her child would have 
adjustment problems if forced to return to Germany.88  The court held 
the grave-risk exception did not apply, but found it would apply in 
situations such as returning a child to a nation gripped by “war, 
famine, or disease”, as well as in circumstances of returning a child 
to a place of “serious abuse or neglect.”89  In addition, the court 
stated that the exception should not be an easily satisfied test that 
would allow parental child abduction to continue.90  In Smedley, the 
                                                                                           
testimony regarding the maturity and age of the children involved in 
the case). 
84 One may infer that the children wished to remain in Germany 
since the allegations of the court-appointed family advocate stated 
Mark physically abused one of the children and that returning them 
to North Carolina would expose them to a serious risk of harm.  
Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 85 See Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 86 78 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (6th Cir. 1996).   
 87 Id. at 1068.  The court stated that a grave-risk of harm could 
exist only in two situations.  Id. at 1069.  First, when returning the 
child before a court can resolve the custody dispute puts the child in 
danger.  Id.  Second, there is a grave-risk of harm when there is a 
previous act of abuse or neglect, when the child has an extraordinary 
emotional dependence on the accused parent, or when the court in the 
country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, is incapable or 
unwilling to adequately protect the child.  Id.  
 88 Id. at 1067. 
 89 Id. at 1069. 
 90 See id. 
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court-appointed family advocate alleged Mark physically abused the 
children,91 but it is unclear whether these allegations were serious 
enough to satisfy the grave-risk exception.  
On the other hand, the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague 
Convention maintains that in order to establish the grave-risk defense, 
the respondent must demonstrate that the court in the country of 
“habitual residence is unwilling or unable to protect” that parent and 
child.92  Accordingly, when mothers are granted asylum in the U.S. 
for physical abuse, which is derivative to children, many courts find 
that the abuse still does not meet the threshold for the grave-risk 
defense.93  Consequently, a parent “who has been granted asylum 
based on domestic violence . . . cannot be forced to return to that 
country.”94  If the court grants a Hague petition and orders the child 
returned to its habitual residence, however, the parent must make the 
extremely difficult choice between returning to the country of her 
abuser or living apart from the child.95  
 However, many courts in the U.S. are following a “further 
analysis” approach to the grave-risk defense.96  The Second Circuit 
held that a court could return a child to his place of habitual residence 
even if there was a grave-risk of physical or psychological harm, as 
long as that country had protocols in place to protect the child from 
that risk.97  Similarly, the First Circuit credited the further analysis 
approach in allowing courts to examine the “placement options and 
legal safeguards in the country of habitual residence to preserve the 
child's safety while the courts of that country have the opportunity to 
determine custody of the children within the physical boundaries of 
their jurisdiction.”98  However, the Eighth Circuit followed a contrary 
                                                
 91 Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 92 See Catherine Norris, Comment, Immigration and Abduction: 
The Relevance of U.S. Immigration Status to Defenses Under the 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 98 CAL. L. REV. 
159, 186 (2010). However, the Hague Convention does not impose 
this requirement.  Id. 
 93 Id. at 169. 
 94 Id. at 189. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000); Croll 
v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Turner v. 
Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 969 (Conn. 2000). 
 97 See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246–47 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 98 See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219. 
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approach in Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley,99 noting the grave-risk 
exception is not based on an inquiry of whether the courts of the 
child's habitual residence can offer protection.100  Cases maintaining 
the past interpretation of returning the child without further analysis 
still exist, but the trend towards further analysis following a finding 
of the grave-risk exception is expanding.101   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Both the U.S. and Germany face the issue of international child 
abduction by parents.  The Hague Convention proves to be an 
effective multilateral treaty by allowing children wrongfully removed 
to, or retained in one member state to be returned to their country of 
habitual residence so that a court of competent jurisdiction can 
properly determine the issue of custody.  Its vague provisions present 
challenges in interpretation, particularly the objection of the child 
and the grave-risk exception, which are being construed 
inconsistently by courts of different countries.  Further, though the 
primary objective of the Hague Convention is securing cooperation 
among nations, not all courts are so compliant.  Nevertheless, in 
Smedley, the Fourth Circuit rigidly applied principles of comity to the 
German court’s judgment by finding that its decision was at least 
minimally reasonable, thus providing useful precedent for other 












                                                
 99 58 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 100 See id. at 377. 
 101 Nelson, supra note 69, at 687–88.  See Blondin v. Dubois, 19 
F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated, 189 F.3d 240 (2d 
Cir. 1999). 
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